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Abstract
Overfitting is the bane of data analysts, even when data are plentiful. Formal approaches to under-
standing this problem focus on statistical inference and generalization of individual analysis procedures.
Yet the practice of data analysis is an inherently interactive and adaptive process: new analyses and
hypotheses are proposed after seeing the results of previous ones, parameters are tuned on the basis of
obtained results, and datasets are shared and reused. An investigation of this gap has recently been
initiated by the authors in [DFH+14], where we focused on the problem of estimating expectations of
adaptively chosen functions.
In this paper, we give a simple and practical method for reusing a holdout (or testing) set to validate
the accuracy of hypotheses produced by a learning algorithm operating on a training set. Reusing a
holdout set adaptively multiple times can easily lead to overfitting to the holdout set itself. We give an
algorithm that enables the validation of a large number of adaptively chosen hypotheses, while provably
avoiding overfitting. We illustrate the advantages of our algorithm over the standard use of the holdout
set via a simple synthetic experiment.
We also formalize and address the general problem of data reuse in adaptive data analysis. We
show how the differential-privacy based approach given in [DFH+14] is applicable much more broadly
to adaptive data analysis. We then show that a simple approach based on description length can also
be used to give guarantees of statistical validity in adaptive settings. Finally, we demonstrate that
these incomparable approaches can be unified via the notion of approximate max-information that we
introduce. This, in particular, allows the preservation of statistical validity guarantees even when an
analyst adaptively composes algorithms which have guarantees based on either of the two approaches.
1 Introduction
The goal of machine learning is to produce hypotheses or models that generalize well to the unseen instances
of the problem. More generally, statistical data analysis is concerned with estimating properties of the
underlying data distribution, rather than properties that are specific to the finite data set at hand. Indeed, a
large body of theoretical and empirical research was developed for ensuring generalization in a variety of
settings. In this work, it is commonly assumed that each analysis procedure (such as a learning algorithm)
operates on a freshly sampled dataset – or if not, is validated on a freshly sampled holdout (or testing) set.
Unfortunately, learning and inference can be more difficult in practice, where data samples are often
reused. For example, a common practice is to perform feature selection on a dataset, and then use the
features for some supervised learning task. When these two steps are performed on the same dataset, it is no
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longer clear that the results obtained from the combined algorithm will generalize. Although not usually
understood in these terms, “Freedman’s paradox” is an elegant demonstration of the powerful (negative) effect
of adaptive analysis on the same data [Fre83]. In Freedman’s simulation, variables with significant t-statistic
are selected and linear regression is performed on this adaptively chosen subset of variables, with famously
misleading results: when the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables is non-existent,
the procedure overfits, erroneously declaring significant relationships.
Most of machine learning practice does not rely on formal guarantees of generalization for learning
algorithms. Instead a dataset is split randomly into two (or sometimes more) parts: the training set and the
testing, or holdout, set. The training set is used for learning a predictor, and then the holdout set is used
to estimate the accuracy of the predictor on the true distribution1. Because the predictor is independent
of the holdout dataset, such an estimate is a valid estimate of the true prediction accuracy (formally, this
allows one to construct a confidence interval for the prediction accuracy on the data distribution). However,
in practice the holdout dataset is rarely used only once, and as a result the predictor may not be independent
of the holdout set, resulting in overfitting to the holdout set [Reu03, RF08, CT10]. One well-known reason
for such dependence is that the holdout data is used to test a large number of predictors and only the best
one is reported. If the set of all tested hypotheses is known and independent of the holdout set, then it is
easy to account for such multiple testing or use the more sophisticated approach of Ng [Ng97].
However such static approaches do not apply if the estimates or hypotheses tested on the holdout are
chosen adaptively: that is, if the choice of hypotheses depends on previous analyses performed on the
dataset. One prominent example in which a holdout set is often adaptively reused is hyperparameter tuning
(e.g.[DFN07]). Similarly, the holdout set in a machine learning competition, such as the famous ImageNet
competition, is typically reused many times adaptively. Other examples include using the holdout set for
feature selection, generation of base learners (in aggregation techniques such as boosting and bagging),
checking a stopping condition, and analyst-in-the-loop decisions. See [Lan05] for a discussion of several subtle
causes of overfitting.
The concrete practical problem we address is how to ensure that the holdout set can be reused to perform
validation in the adaptive setting. Towards addressing this problem we also ask the more general question
of how one can ensure that the final output of adaptive data analysis generalizes to the underlying data
distribution. This line of research was recently initiated by the authors in [DFH+14], where we focused on
the case of estimating expectations of functions from i.i.d. samples (these are also referred to as statistical
queries). They show how to answer a large number of adaptively chosen statistical queries using techniques
from differential privacy [DMNS06](see Sec. 1.3 and Sec. 2.2 for more details).
1.1 Our Results
We propose a simple and general formulation of the problem of preserving statistical validity in adaptive
data analysis. We show that the connection between differentially private algorithms and generalization from
[DFH+14] can be extended to this more general setting, and show that similar (but sometimes incomparable)
guarantees can be obtained from algorithms whose outputs can be described by short strings. We then
define a new notion, approximate max-information, that unifies these two basic techniques and gives a new
perspective on the problem. In particular, we give an adaptive composition theorem for max-information,
which gives a simple way to obtain generalization guarantees for analyses in which some of the procedures
are differentially private and some have short description length outputs. We apply our techniques to the
problem of reusing the holdout set for validation in the adaptive setting.
1.1.1 A Reusable Holdout
We describe a simple and general method, together with two specific instantiations, for reusing a holdout
set for validating results while provably avoiding overfitting to the holdout set. The analyst can perform
any analysis on the training dataset, but can only access the holdout set via an algorithm that allows the
1Additional averaging over different partitions is used in cross-validation.
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analyst to validate her hypotheses against the holdout set. Crucially, our algorithm prevents overfitting to the
holdout set even when the analysts hypotheses are chosen adaptively on the basis of the previous responses
of our algorithm.
Our first algorithm, referred to as Thresholdout, derives its guarantees from differential privacy and the
results in [DFH+14, NS15]. For any function φ : X → [0, 1] given by the analyst, Thresholdout uses the
holdout set to validate that φ does not overfit to the training set, that is, it checks that the mean value of φ
evaluated on the training set is close to the mean value of φ evaluated on the distribution P from which the
data was sampled. The standard approach to such validation would be to compute the mean value of φ on the
holdout set. The use of the holdout set in Thresholdout differs from the standard use in that it exposes very
little information about the mean of φ on the holdout set: if φ does not overfit to the training set, then the
analyst receives only the confirmation of closeness, that is, just a single bit. On the other hand, if φ overfits
then Thresholdout returns the mean value of φ on the training set perturbed by carefully calibrated noise.
Using results from [DFH+14, NS15] we show that for datasets consisting of i.i.d. samples these modifications
provably prevent the analyst from constructing functions that overfit to the holdout set. This ensures
correctness of Thresholdout’s responses. Naturally, the specific guarantees depend on the number of samples
n in the holdout set. The number of queries that Thresholdout can answer is exponential in n as long as the
number of times that the analyst overfits is at most quadratic in n.
Our second algorithm SparseValidate is based on the idea that if most of the time the analysts procedures
generate results that do not overfit, then validating them against the holdout set does not reveal much
information about the holdout set. Specifically, the generalization guarantees of this method follow from
the observation that the transcript of the interaction between a data analyst and the holdout set can be
described concisely. More formally, this method allows the analyst to pick any Boolean function of a dataset
ψ (described by an algorithm) and receive back its value on the holdout set. A simple example of such a
function would be whether the accuracy of a predictor on the holdout set is at least a certain value α. (Unlike
in the case of Thresholdout, here there is no need to assume that the function that measures the accuracy
has a bounded range or even Lipschitz, making it qualitatively different from the kinds of results achievable
subject to differential privacy). A more involved example of validation would be to run an algorithm on
the holdout dataset to select an hypothesis and check if the hypothesis is similar to that obtained on the
training set (for any desired notion of similarity). Such validation can be applied to other results of analysis;
for example one could check if the variables selected on the holdout set have large overlap with those selected
on the training set. An instantiation of the SparseValidate algorithm has already been applied to the problem
of answering statistical (and more general) queries in the adaptive setting [BSSU15]. We describe the formal
guarantees for SparseValidate in Section 4.2.
In Section 5 we describe a simple experiment on synthetic data that illustrates the danger of reusing
a standard holdout set, and how this issue can be resolved by our reusable holdout. The design of this
experiment is inspired by Freedman’s classical experiment, which demonstrated the dangers of performing
variable selection and regression on the same data [Fre83].
1.2 Generalization in Adaptive Data Analysis
We view adaptive analysis on the same dataset as an execution of a sequence of steps A1 → A2 → · · · → Am.
Each step is described by an algorithm Ai that takes as input a fixed dataset S = (x1, . . . , xn) drawn from
some distribution D over Xn, which remains unchanged over the course of the analysis. Each algorithm Ai
also takes as input the outputs of the previously run algorithms A1 through Ai−1 and produces a value in
some range Yi. The dependence on previous outputs represents all the adaptive choices that are made at step
i of data analysis. For example, depending on the previous outputs, Ai can run different types of analysis on
S. We note that at this level of generality, the algorithms can represent the choices of the data analyst, and
need not be explicitly specified. We assume that the analyst uses algorithms which individually are known to
generalize when executed on a fresh dataset sampled independently from a distribution D. We formalize
this by assuming that for every fixed value y1, . . . , yi−1 ∈ Y1 × · · · × Yi−1, with probability at least 1− βi
over the choice of S according to distribution D, the output of Ai on inputs y1, . . . , yi−1 and S has a desired
property relative to the data distribution D (for example has low generalization error). Note that in this
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assumption y1, . . . , yi−1 are fixed and independent of the choice of S, whereas the analyst will execute Ai on
values Y1, . . . ,Yi−1, where Yj = Aj(S,Y1, . . . ,Yj−1). In other words, in the adaptive setup, the algorithm
Ai can depend on the previous outputs, which depend on S, and thus the set S given to Ai is no longer
an independently sampled dataset. Such dependence invalidates the generalization guarantees of individual
procedures, potentially leading to overfitting.
Differential privacy: First, we spell out how the differential privacy based approach from [DFH+14] can
be applied to this more general setting. Specifically, a simple corollary of results in [DFH+14] is that for a
dataset consisting of i.i.d. samples any output of a differentially-private algorithm can be used in subsequent
analysis while controlling the risk of overfitting, even beyond the setting of statistical queries studied in
[DFH+14]. A key property of differential privacy in this context is that it composes adaptively: namely if each
of the algorithms used by the analyst is differentially private, then the whole procedure will be differentially
private (albeit with worse privacy parameters). Therefore, one way to avoid overfitting in the adaptive setting
is to use algorithms that satisfy (sufficiently strong) guarantees of differential-privacy. In Section 2.2 we
describe this result formally.
Description length: We then show how description length bounds can be applied in the context of
guaranteeing generalization in the presence of adaptivity. If the total length of the outputs of algorithms
A1, . . . ,Ai−1 can be described with k bits then there are at most 2k possible values of the input y1, . . . , yi−1
to Ai. For each of these individual inputs Ai generalizes with probability 1− βi. Taking a union bound over
failure probabilities implies generalization with probability at least 1− 2kβi. Occam’s Razor famously implies
that shorter hypotheses have lower generalization error. Our observation is that shorter hypotheses (and the
results of analysis more generally) are also better in the adaptive setting since they reveal less about the
dataset and lead to better generalization of subsequent analyses. Note that this result makes no assumptions
about the data distribution D. We provide the formal details in Section 2.3. In Section B we also show that
description length-based analysis suffices for obtaining an algorithm (albeit not an efficient one) that can
answer an exponentially large number of adaptively chosen statistical queries. This provides an alternative
proof for one of the results in [DFH+14].
Approximate max-information: Our main technical contribution is the introduction and analysis of
a new information-theoretic measure, which unifies the generalization arguments that come from both
differential privacy and description length, and that quantifies how much information has been learned about
the data by the analyst. Formally, for jointly distributed random variables (S,Y ), the max-information is
the maximum of the logarithm of the factor by which uncertainty about S is reduced given the value of
Y , namely I∞(S,Y )
.
= log max P[S=S | Y =y]P[S=S] , where the maximum is taken over all S in the support of S
and y in the support Y . Informally, β-approximate max-information requires that the logarithm above be
bounded with probability at least 1− β over the choice of (S,Y ) (the actual definition is slightly weaker, see
Definition 10 for details).In our use, S denotes a dataset drawn randomly from the distribution D and Y
denotes the output of a (possibly randomized) algorithm on S. We prove that approximate max-information
has the following properties
• An upper bound on (approximate) max-information gives generalization guarantees.
• Differentially private algorithms have low max-information for any distribution D over datasets. A
stronger bound holds for approximate max-information on i.i.d. datasets. These bounds apply only to
so-called pure differential privacy (the δ = 0 case).
• Bounds on the description length of the output of an algorithm give bounds on the approximate
max-information of the algorithm for any D.
• Approximate max-information composes adaptively.
• Approximate max-information is preserved under post-processing.
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Composition properties of approximate max-information imply that one can easily obtain generalization
guarantees for adaptive sequences of algorithms, some of which are differentially private, and others of which
have outputs with short description length. These properties also imply that differential privacy can be used
to control generalization for any distribution D over datasets, which extends its generalization guarantees
beyond the restriction to datasets drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distribution, as in [DFH+14].
We remark that (pure) differential privacy and description length are otherwise incomparable – low
description length is not a sufficient condition for differential privacy, since differential privacy precludes
revealing even a small number of bits of information about any single individual in the data set. At the same
time differential privacy does not constrain the description length of the output. Bounds on max-information
or differential privacy of an algorithm can, however, be translated to bounds on randomized description length
for a different algorithm with statistically indistinguishable output. Here we say that a randomized algorithm
has randomized description length of k if for every fixing of the algorithm’s random bits, it has description
length of k. Details of these results and additional discussion appear in Sections 3 and A.
1.3 Related Work
This work builds on [DFH+14] where we initiated the formal study of adaptivity in data analysis. The
primary focus of [DFH+14] is the problem of answering adaptively chosen statistical queries. The main
technique is a strong connection between differential privacy and generalization: differential privacy guarantees
that the distribution of outputs does not depend too much on any one of the data samples, and thus,
differential privacy gives a strong stability guarantee that behaves well under adaptive data analysis. The
link between generalization and approximate differential privacy made in [DFH+14] has been subsequently
strengthened, both qualitatively — by [BSSU15], who make the connection for a broader range of queries —
and quantitatively, by [NS15] and [BSSU15], who give tighter quantitative bounds. These papers, among
other results, give methods for accurately answering exponentially (in the dataset size) many adaptively
chosen queries, but the algorithms for this task are not efficient. It turns out this is for fundamental reasons
– Hardt and Ullman [HU14] and Steinke and Ullman [SU14] prove that, under cryptographic assumptions,
no efficient algorithm can answer more than quadratically many statistical queries chosen adaptively by an
adversary who knows the true data distribution.
Differential privacy emerged from a line of work [DN03, DN04, BDMN05], culminating in the definition
given by [DMNS06]. There is a very large body of work designing differentially private algorithms for various
data analysis tasks, some of which we leverage in our applications. See [Dwo11] for a short survey and [DR14]
for a textbook introduction to differential privacy.
The classical approach in theoretical machine learning to ensure that empirical estimates generalize to
the underlying distribution is based on the various notions of complexity of the set of functions output by
the algorithm, most notably the VC dimension(see e.g. [SSBD14] for a textbook introduction). If one has a
sample of data large enough to guarantee generalization for all functions in some class of bounded complexity,
then it does not matter whether the data analyst chooses functions in this class adaptively or non-adaptively.
Our goal, in contrast, is to prove generalization bounds without making any assumptions about the class
from which the analyst can choose query functions. In this case the adaptive setting is very different from
the non-adaptive setting.
An important line of work [BE02, MNPR06, PRMN04, SSSSS10] establishes connections between the
stability of a learning algorithm and its ability to generalize. Stability is a measure of how much the output
of a learning algorithm is perturbed by changes to its input. It is known that certain stability notions are
necessary and sufficient for generalization. Unfortunately, the stability notions considered in these prior
works do not compose in the sense that running multiple stable algorithms sequentially and adaptively may
result in a procedure that is not stable. The measure we introduce in this work (max information), like
differential privacy, has the strength that it enjoys adaptive composition guarantees. This makes it amenable
to reasoning about the generalization properties of adaptively applied sequences of algorithms, while having
to analyze only the individual components of these algorithms. Connections between stability, empirical risk
minimization and differential privacy in the context of learnability have been recently explored in [WLF15].
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Freund gives an approach to obtaining data-dependent generalization bounds that takes into account the
set of statistical queries that a given learning algorithm can produce for the distribution from which the
data was sampled [Fre98]. A related approach of Langford and Blum also allows to obtain data-dependent
generalization bounds based on the description length of functions that can be output for a data distribution
[LB03]. Unlike our work, these approaches require the knowledge of the structure of the learning algorithm
to derive a generalization bound. More importantly, the focus of our framework is on the design of new
algorithms with better generalization properties in the adaptive setting.
Finally, inspired by our work, Blum and Hardt [BH15] showed how to reuse the holdout set to maintain
an accurate leaderboard in a machine learning competition that allows the participants to submit adaptively
chosen models in the process of the competition (such as those organized by Kaggle Inc.). Their analysis also
relies on the description length-based technique we used to analyze SparseValidate.
2 Preliminaries and Basic Techniques
In the discussion below log refers to binary logarithm and ln refers to the natural logarithm. For simplicity
we restrict our random variables to finite domains (extension of the claims to continuous domains is
straightforward using the standard formalism). For two random variables X and Y over the same domain X
the max-divergence of X from Y is defined as
D∞(X‖Y ) = log max
x∈X
P[X = x]
P[Y = x]
.
δ-approximate max-divergence is defined as
Dδ∞(X‖Y ) = log maxO⊆X , P[X∈O]>δ
P[X ∈ O]− δ
P[Y ∈ O] .
We say that a real-valued function over datasets f : Xn → R has sensitivity c for all i ∈ [n] and
x1, x2, . . . , xn, x
′
i ∈ X , f(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn)−f(x1, . . . , x′i, . . . , xn) ≤ c. We review McDiarmid’s concentration
inequality for functions of low-sensitivity.
Lemma 1 (McDiarmid’s inequality). Let X1, X2, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables taking values
in the set X . Further let f : Xn → R be a function of sensitivity c > 0. Then for all α > 0, and
µ = E [f(X1, . . . ,Xn)],
P
[
f(
¯
X1, . . . ,Xn)− µ ≥ α
]
≤ exp
(−2α2
n · c2
)
.
For a function φ : X → R and a dataset S = (x1, . . . , xn), let ES [φ] .= 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(xi). Note that if the
range of φ is in some interval of length α then f(S) = ES [φ] has sensitivity α/n. For a distribution P over X
and a function φ : X → R, let P[φ] .= Ex∼P [φ(x)].
2.1 Differential Privacy
On an intuitive level, differential privacy hides the data of any single individual. We are thus interested in
pairs of datasets S, S′ that differ in a single element, in which case we say S and S′ are adjacent.
Definition 2. [DMNS06, DKM+06] A randomized algorithm A with domain Xn for n > 0 is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for all pairs of datasets that differ in a single element S, S′ ∈ Xn: Dδ∞(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤
log(eε). The case when δ = 0 is sometimes referred to as pure differential privacy, and in this case we may
say simply that A is ε-differentially private.
Differential privacy is preserved under adaptive composition. Adaptive composition of algorithms is
a sequential execution of algorithms on the same dataset in which an algorithm at step i can depend on
the outputs of previous algorithms. More formally, let A1,A2, . . . ,Am be a sequence of algorithms. Each
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algorithm Ai outputs a value in some range Yi and takes as an input dataset in Xn as well as a value in
Y¯i−1 .= Y1 × · · · × Yi−1. Adaptive composition of these algorithm is the algorithm that takes as an input
a dataset S ∈ Xn and executes A1 → A2 → · · · → Am sequentially with the input to Ai being S and the
outputs y1, . . . , yi−1 of A1, . . . ,Ai−1. Such composition captures the common practice in data analysis of
using the outcomes of previous analyses (that is y1, . . . , yi−1) to select an algorithm that is executed on S.
For an algorithm that in addition to a dataset has other input we say that it is (ε, δ)-differentially private
if it is (ε, δ)-differentially private for every setting of additional parameters. The basic property of adaptive
composition of differentially private algorithms is the following result (e.g.[DL09]):
Theorem 3. Let Ai : Xn × Y1 × · · · × Yi−1 → Yi be an (εi, δi)-differentially private algorithm for i ∈ [m].
Then the algorithm B : Xn → Ym obtained by composing Ai’s adaptively is (
∑m
i=1 εi,
∑m
i=1 δi)-differentially
private.
A more sophisticated argument yields significant improvement when ε < 1 (e.g.[DR14]).
Theorem 4. For all ε, δ, δ′ ≥ 0, the adaptive composition of m arbitrary (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms
is (ε′,mδ + δ′)-differentially private, where
ε′ =
√
2m ln(1/δ′) · ε+mε(eε − 1).
Another property of differential privacy important for our applications is preservation of its guarantee
under post-processing (e.g.[DR14, Prop. 2.1]):
Lemma 5. If A is an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm with domain Xn and range Y, and B is any,
possibly randomized, algorithm with domain Y and range Y ′′, then the algorithm B ◦ A with domain Xn and
range Y ′ is also (, δ)-differentially private.
2.2 Generalization via Differential Privacy
Generalization in special cases of our general adaptive analysis setting can be obtained directly from results in
[DFH+14] and composition properties of differentially private algorithms. For the case of pure differentially
private algorithms with general outputs over i.i.d. datasets, in [DFH+14] we prove the following result.
Theorem 6. Let A be an ε-differentially private algorithm with range Y and let S be a random variable
drawn from a distribution Pn over Xn. Let Y = A(S) be the corresponding output distribution. Assume that
for each element y ∈ Y there is a subset R(y) ⊆ Xn so that maxy∈Y P[S ∈ R(y)] ≤ β. Then, for ε ≤
√
ln(1/β)
2n
we have P[S ∈ R(Y )] ≤ 3√β.
An immediate corollary of Thm. 6 together with Lemma 1 is that differentially private algorithms that
output low-sensitivity functions generalize.
Corollary 7. Let A be an algorithm that outputs a c-sensitive function f : Xn → R. Let S be a random
dataset chosen according to distribution Pn over Xn and let f = A(S). If A is τ/(cn)-differentially private
then P[f(S)− Pn[f ] ≥ τ ] ≤ 3 exp (−τ2/(c2n)).
By Theorem 3, pure differential privacy composes adaptively. Therefore, if in a sequence of algorithms
A1,A2, . . . ,Am algorithm Ai is εi-differentially private for all i ≤ m− 1 then composition of the first i− 1
algorithms is ε′i−1-differentially private for ε
′
i−1 =
(∑i−1
j=1 εj
)
. Theorem 6 can be applied to preserve the
generalization guarantees of the last algorithm Am (that does not need to be differentially private). For
example, assume that for every fixed setting of y¯m−1, Am has the property that it outputs a hypothesis
function h such that, P[ES [L(h)]− P [L(h)] ≥ τ ] ≤ e−nτ2/d, for some notion of dimension d and a real-valued
loss function L. Generalization bounds of this type follow from uniform convergence arguments based on
various notions of complexity of hypotheses classes such as VC dimension, covering numbers, fat-shattering
dimension and Rademacher complexity (see [SSBD14] for examples). Note that, for different settings of y¯m−1,
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different sets of hypotheses and generalization techniques might be used. We define R(y¯m−1) be all datasets
S for which Am(S, y¯m−1) outputs h such that ES [L(h)]− P [L(h)] ≥ τ . Now if ε′m−1 ≤
√
τ2/(2d), then even
for the hypothesis output in the adaptive execution of Am on a random i.i.d. dataset S (denoted by h) we
have P [ES [L(h)]− P[L(h)] ≥ τ ] ≤ 3e−τ2n/(2d).
For approximate (ε, δ)-differential privacy, strong preservation of generalization results are currently
known only for algorithms that output a function over X of bounded range (for simplicity we use range [0, 1])
[DFH+14, NS15]. The following result was proved by Nissim and Stemmer [NS15] (a weaker statement is
also given in [DFH+14, Thm. 10]).
Theorem 8. Let A be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that outputs a function from X to [0, 1]. For
a random variable S distributed according to Pn we let φ = A(S). Then for n ≥ 2 ln(8/δ)/ε2,
P [|P[φ]− ES [φ]| ≥ 13ε] ≤ 2δ
ε
ln
(
2
ε
)
.
Many learning algorithms output a hypothesis function that aims to minimize some bounded loss function
L as the final output. If algorithms used in all steps of the adaptive data analysis are differentially private and
the last step (that is, Am) outputs a hypothesis h, then generalization bounds for the loss of h are implied
directly by Theorem 8. We remark that this application is different from the example for pure differential
privacy above since there we showed preservation of generalization guarantees of arbitrarily complex learning
algorithm Am which need not be differentially private. In Section 4 we give an application of Theorem 8 to
the reusable holdout problem.
2.3 Generalization via Description Length
Let A : Xn → Y and B : Xn × Y → Y ′ be two algorithms. We now give a simple application of bounds on
the size of Y (or, equivalently, the description length of A’s output) to preserving generalization of B. Here
generalization can actually refer to any valid or desirable output of B for a given given dataset S and input
y ∈ Y . Specifically we will use a set R(y) ⊆ Xn to denote all datasets for which the output of B on y and S
is “bad” (e.g. overfits). Using a simple union bound we show that the probability (over a random choice of a
dataset) of such bad outcome can be bounded.
Theorem 9. Let A : Xn → Y be an algorithm and let S be a random dataset over Xn. Assume that
R : Y → 2Xn is such that for every y ∈ Y, P[S ∈ R(y)] ≤ β. Then P[S ∈ R(A(S))] ≤ |Y| · β.
Proof.
P[S ∈ R(A(S))] ≤
∑
y∈Y
P[S ∈ R(y)] ≤ |Y| · β.
The case of two algorithms implies the general case since description length composes (adaptively).
Namely, let A1,A2, . . . ,Am be a sequence of algorithms such that each algorithm Ai outputs a value in some
range Yi and takes as an input dataset in Xn as well as a value in Y¯i−1. Then for every i, we can view
the execution of A1 through Ai−1 as the first algorithm A¯i−1 with an output in Y¯i−1 and Ai as the second
algorithm. Theorem 9 implies that if for every setting of y¯i−1 = y1, . . . , yi−1 ∈ Y¯i−1, R(y¯i−1) ⊆ Xn satisfies
that P[S ∈ R(y¯i−1)] ≤ βi then
P[S ∈ R(A¯i−1(S))] ≤ |Y¯i−1| · βi =
i−1∏
j=1
|Yj | · βi.
In Section A we describe a generalization of description length bounds to randomized algorithms and
show that it possesses the same properties.
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3 Max-Information
Consider two algorithms A : Xn → Y and B : Xn×Y → Y ′ that are composed adaptively and assume that for
every fixed input y ∈ Y , B generalizes for all but fraction β of datasets. Here we are speaking of generalization
informally: our definitions will support any property of input y ∈ Y and dataset S. Intuitively, to preserve
generalization of B we want to make sure that the output of A does not reveal too much information about
the dataset S. We demonstrate that this intuition can be captured via a notion of max-information and its
relaxation approximate max-information.
For two random variables X and Y we use X × Y to denote the random variable obtained by drawing
X and Y independently from their probability distributions.
Definition 10. Let X and Y be jointly distributed random variables. The max-information between X and
Y , denoted I∞(X;Y ), is the minimal value of k such that for every x in the support of X and y in the
support of Y we have P[X = x | Y = y] ≤ 2k P[X = x]. Alternatively, I∞(X;Y ) = D∞((X,Y )‖X × Y ).
The β-approximate max-information is defined as Iβ∞(X;Y ) = D
β
∞((X,Y )‖X × Y ).
It follows immediately from Bayes’ rule that for all β ≥ 0, Iβ∞(X;Y ) = Iβ∞(Y ;X). Further, I∞(X;Y ) ≤ k
if and only if for all x in the support of X, D∞(Y | X = x ‖ Y ) ≤ k. Clearly, max-information upper
bounds the classical notion of mutual information: I∞(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ).
In our use (X,Y ) is going to be a joint distribution (S,A(S)), where S is a random n-element dataset
and A is a (possibly randomized) algorithm taking a dataset as an input. If the output of an algorithm on any
distribution S has low approximate max-information then we say that the algorithm has low max-information.
More formally:
Definition 11. We say that an algorithm A has β-approximate max-information of k if for every distribution
S over n-element datasets, Iβ∞(S;A(S)) ≤ k, where S is a dataset chosen randomly according to S. We
denote this by Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ k.
An alternative way to define the (pure) max-information of an algorithm is using the maximum of the
infinity divergence between distributions on two different inputs.
Lemma 12. Let A be an algorithm with domain Xn and range Y. Then I∞(A, n) = maxS,S′∈Xn D∞(A(S)‖A(S′)).
Proof. For the first direction let k = maxS,S′∈Xn D∞(A(S)‖A(S′)). Let S be any random variable over
n-element input datasets for A and let Y be the corresponding output distribution Y = A(S). We will argue
that I∞(Y ;S) ≤ k, that I∞(S;Y ) ≤ k follows immediately from the Bayes’ rule. For every y ∈ Y, there
must exist a dataset Sy such that P[Y = y | S = Sy] ≤ P[Y = y]. Now, by our assumption, for every S,
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ 2k · P[Y = y | S = Sy]. We can conclude that for every S and every y, it holds that
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ 2k P[Y = y]. This yields I∞(Y ;S) ≤ k.
For the other direction let k = I∞(A, n), let S, S′ ∈ Xn and y ∈ Y. For α ∈ (0, 1), let S be the random
variable equal to S with probability α and to S′ with probability 1−α and let Y = A(S). By our assumption,
I∞(Y ;S) = I∞(S;Y ) ≤ k. This gives
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ 2k P[Y = y] ≤ 2k (αP[Y = y | S = S] + (1− α)P[Y = y | S = S′])
and implies
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ 2
k(1− α)
1− 2kα · P[Y = y | S = S
′].
This holds for every α > 0 and therefore
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ 2k · P[Y = y | S = S′].
Using this inequality for every y ∈ Y we obtain D∞(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ k.
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Generalization via max-information: An immediate corollary of our definition of approximate max-
information is that it controls the probability of “bad events” that can happen as a result of the dependence
of A(S) on S.
Theorem 13. Let S be a random dataset in Xn and A be an algorithm with range Y such that for some
β ≥ 0, Iβ∞(S;A(S)) = k. Then for any event O ⊆ Xn × Y,
P[(S,A(S)) ∈ O] ≤ 2k · P[S ×A(S) ∈ O] + β.
In particular, P[(S,A(S)) ∈ O] ≤ 2k ·maxy∈Y P[(S, y) ∈ O] + β.
We remark that mutual information between S and A(S) would not suffice for ensuring that bad events
happen with tiny probability. For example mutual information of k allows P[(S,A(S)) ∈ O] to be as high as
k/(2 log(1/δ)), where δ = P[S ×A(S) ∈ O].
Composition of max-information: Approximate max-information satisfies the following adaptive com-
position property:
Lemma 14. Let A : Xn → Y be an algorithm such that Iβ1∞ (A, n) ≤ k1, and let B : Xn × Y → Z be an
algorithm such that for every y ∈ Y, B(·, y) has β2-approximate max-information k2. Let C : Xn → Z be
defined such that C(S) = B(S,A(S)). Then Iβ1+β2∞ (C, n) ≤ k1 + k2.
Proof. Let D be a distribution over Xn and S be a random dataset sampled from D. By hypothesis,
Iβ1∞ (S;A(S)) ≤ k1. Expanding out the definition for all O ⊆ Xn × Y:
P[(S,A(S)) ∈ O] ≤ 2k1 · P[S ×A(S) ∈ O] + β1 .
We also have for all Q ⊆ Xn ×Z and for all y ∈ Y:
P[(S,B(S, y)) ∈ Q] ≤ 2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q] + β2 .
For every O ⊆ Xn × Y, define
µ(O) = (P[(S,A(S)) ∈ O]− 2k1 · P[S ×A(S) ∈ O])
+
.
Observe that µ(O) ≤ β1 for all O ⊆ Xn × Y. For any event Q ⊆ Xn ×Z, we have:
10
P[(S, C(S)) ∈ Q]
= P[(S,B(S,A(S))) ∈ Q]
=
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
P[(S,B(S, y)) ∈ Q] · P[S = S,A(S) = y]
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
min
((
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q] + β2
)
, 1
) · P[S = S,A(S) = y]
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
(
min
(
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q], 1)+ β2) · P[S = S,A(S) = y]
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
min
(
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q], 1) · P[S = S,A(S) = y] + β2
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
min
(
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q], 1) · (2k1 · P[S = S] · P[A(S) = y] + µ(S, y))+ β2
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
min
(
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q], 1) · 2k1 · P[S = S] · P[A(S) = y] + ∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
µ(S, y) + β2
≤
∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
min
(
2k2 · P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q], 1) · 2k1 · P[S = S] · P[A(S) = y] + β1 + β2
≤ 2k1+k2 ·
 ∑
S∈Xn,y∈Y
P[S × B(S, y) ∈ Q] · P[S = S] · P[A(S) = y]
+ β1 + β2
= 2k1+k2 · P[S × B(S,A(S)) ∈ Q] + (β1 + β2) .
Applying the definition of max-information, we see that equivalently, Iβ1+β2∞ (S; C(S)) ≤ k1 + k2, which is
what we wanted.
This lemma can be iteratively applied, which immediately yields the following adaptive composition
theorem for max-information:
Theorem 15. Consider an arbitrary sequence of algorithms A1, . . . ,Ak with ranges Y1, . . . ,Yk such that for
all i, Ai : Xn × Y1 × . . .× Yi−1 → Yi is such that Ai(·, y1, . . . , yi−1) has βi-approximate max-information ki
for all choices of y1, . . . , yi−1 ∈ Y1 × . . .× Yi−1. Let the algorithm B : Xn → Yk be defined as follows:
B(S):
1. Let y1 = A1(S).
2. For i = 2 to k: Let yi = Ai(S, y1, . . . , yi−1)
3. Output yk
Then B has (∑i βi)-approximate max-information (∑i ki).
Post-processing of Max-information: Another useful property that (approximate) max-information
shares with differential privacy is preservation under post-processing. The simple proof of this lemma is
identical to that for differential privacy (Lemma 5) and hence is omitted.
Lemma 16. If A is an algorithm with domain Xn and range Y, and B is any, possibly randomized, algorithm
with domain Y and range Y ′′, then the algorithm B ◦ A with domain Xn and range Y ′ satisfies: for every
random variable S over Xn and every β ≥ 0, Iβ∞(S;B ◦ A(S)) ≤ Iβ∞(S;A(S)).
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3.1 Bounds on Max-information
We now show that the basic approaches based on description length and (pure) differential privacy are
captured by approximate max-information.
3.1.1 Description Length
Description length k gives the following bound on max-information.
Theorem 17. Let A be a randomized algorithm taking as an input an n-element dataset and outputting a
value in a finite set Y. Then for every β > 0, Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ log(|Y|/β).
We will use the following simple property of approximate divergence (e.g.[DR14]) in the proof. For a
random variable X over X we denote by p(X) the probability distribution associated with X.
Lemma 18. Let X and Y be two random variables over the same domain X . If
P
x∼p(X)
[
P[X = x]
P[Y = x]
≥ 2k
]
≤ β
then Dβ∞(X‖Y ) ≤ k.
Proof Thm. 17. Let S be any random variable over n-element input datasets and let Y be the corresponding
output distribution Y = A(S). We prove that for every β > 0, Iβ∞(S;Y ) ≤ log(|Y|/β).
For y ∈ Y we say that y is “bad” if exists S in the support of S such that
P[Y = y | S = S]
P[Y = y]
≥ |Y|/β.
Let B denote the set of all “bad” y’s. From this definition we obtain that for a “bad” y, P[Y = y] ≤ β/|Y|
and therefore P[Y ∈ B] ≤ β. Let B = Xn ×B. Then
P[(S,Y ) ∈ B] = P[Y ∈ B] ≤ β.
For every (S, y) 6∈ B we have that
P[S = S,Y = y] = P[Y = y | S = S] · P[S = S] ≤ |Y|
β
· P[Y = y] · P[S = S],
and hence
P
(S,y)∼p(S,Y )
[
P[S = S,Y = y]
P[S = S] · P[Y = y] ≥
|Y|
β
]
≤ β.
This, by Lemma 18, gives that Iβ∞(S;Y ) ≤ log(|Y|/β).
We note that Thms. 13 and 17 give a slightly weaker form of Thm. 9. Defining eventO .= {(S, y) | S ∈ R(y)},
the assumptions of Thm. 9 imply that P[S ×A(S) ∈ O] ≤ β. For β′ = √|Y|β, by Thm. 17, we have that
Iβ
′
∞(S;A(S)) ≤ log(|Y|/β′). Now applying, Thm. 13 gives that P[S ∈ R(A(S))] ≤ |Y|/β′ · β + β′ = 2
√|Y|β.
In Section A we introduce a closely related notion of randomized description length and show that it also
provides an upper bound on approximate max-information. More interestingly, for this notion a form of the
reverse bound can be proved: A bound on (approximate) max-information of an algorithm A implies a bound
on the randomized description length of the output of a different algorithm with statistically indistinguishable
from A output.
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3.1.2 Differential Privacy
We now show that pure differential privacy implies a bound on max information. We start with a simple
bound on max-information of differentially private algorithms that applies to all distributions over datasets.
In particular, it implies that the differential privacy-based approach can be used beyond the i.i.d. setting in
[DFH+14].
Theorem 19. Let A be an -differentially private algorithm. Then I∞(A, n) ≤ log e · n.
Proof. Clearly, any two datasets S and S′ differ in at most n elements. Therefore, for every y we have
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ en P[Y = y | S = S′] (this is a direct implication of Definition 2 referred to as group
privacy [DR14]), or equivalently, D∞(A(S)‖A(S′)) ≤ log e · n. By Lemma 3 we obtain the claim.
Finally, we prove a stronger bound on approximate max-information for datasets consisting of i.i.d. samples
using the technique from [DFH+14]. This bound, together with Thm. 13, generalizes Thm. 6.
Theorem 20. Let A be an ε-differentially private algorithm with range Y. For a distribution P over X , let
S be a random variable drawn from Pn. Let Y = A(S) denote the random variable output by A on input S.
Then for any β > 0, Iβ∞(S;A(S)) ≤ log e(ε2n/2 + ε
√
n ln(2/β)/2).
Proof. Fix y ∈ Y. We first observe that by Jensen’s inequality,
E
S∼Pn
[ln(P[Y = y | S = S])] ≤ ln
(
E
S∼Pn
[P[Y = y | S = S]]
)
= ln(P[Y = y]).
Further, by definition of differential privacy, for two databases S, S′ that differ in a single element,
P[Y = y | S = S] ≤ eε · P[Y = y | S = S′].
Now consider the function g(S) = ln
(
P[Y =y | S=S]
P[Y =y]
)
. By the properties above we have that E[g(S)] ≤
ln(P[Y = y])− ln(P[Y = y]) = 0 and |g(S)− g(S′)| ≤ ε. This, by McDiarmid’s inequality (Lemma 1), implies
that for any t > 0,
P[g(S) ≥ t] ≤ e−2t2/(nε2). (1)
For an integer i ≥ 1, let ti .= ε2n/2 + ε
√
n ln(2i/β)/2 and let
Bi
.
= {S | ti < g(S) ≤ ti+1 } .
Let
By
.
= {S |g(S) > t1 } =
⋃
i≥1
Bi.
By inequality (1), we have that for i ≥ 1,
P[g(S) > ti] ≤ exp
(
−2
(
ε
√
n/2 +
√
ln(2i/β)/2
)2)
.
By Bayes’ rule, for every S ∈ Bi,
P[S = S | Y = y]
P[S = S]
=
P[Y = y | S = S]
P[Y = y]
= exp(g(S)) ≤ exp(ti+1).
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Therefore,
P[S ∈ Bi | Y = y] =
∑
S∈Bi
P[S = S | Y = y]
≤ exp(ti+i) ·
∑
S∈Bi
P[S = S]
≤ exp(ti+i) · P[g(S) ≥ ti]
= exp
(
ε2n/2 + ε
√
n ln(2i+1/β)/2− 2
(
ε
√
n/2 +
√
ln(2i/β)/2
)2)
≤ exp
(
ε
√
n/2
(√
ln(2i+1/β)− 2
√
ln(2i/β)
)
− ln(2i/β)
)
< exp(− ln(2i/β)) = β/2i.
An immediate implication of this is that
P[S ∈ By | Y = y] =
∑
i
P[S ∈ Bi | Y = y] ≤
∑
i≥1
β/2i ≤ β.
Let B = {(S, y) | y ∈ Y, S ∈ By}. Then
P[(S,Y ) ∈ B] = P[(S,Y ) ∈ BY ] ≤ β. (2)
For every (S, y) 6∈ B we have that
P[S = S,Y = y] = P[S = S | Y = y] · P[Y = y] ≤ exp(t1) · P[S = S] · P[Y = y],
and hence by eq.(2) we get that
P
(S,y)∼p(S,Y )
[
P[S = S,Y = y]
P[S = S] · P[Y = y] ≥ exp(t1)
]
≤ β.
This, by Lemma 18, gives that
Iβ∞(S;Y ) ≤ log(exp(t1)) = log e(ε2n/2 + ε
√
n ln(2/β)/2).
Applications: We give two simple examples of using the bounds on max-information obtained from
differential privacy to preserve bounds on generalization error that follow from concentration of measure
inequalities. Strong concentration of measure results are at the core of most generalization guarantees in
machine learning. Let A be an algorithm that outputs a function f : Xn → R of sensitivity c and define the
“bad event” Oτ is when the empirical estimate of f is more than τ away from the expectation of f(S) for S
distributed according to some distribution D over Xn. Namely,
Oτ = {(S, f) : f(S)−D[f ] ≥ τ} , (3)
where D[f ] denotes ES∼D[f(S)].
By McDiarmid’s inequality (Lem. 1) we know that, if S is distributed according to Pn then supf :Xn→R P[(S, f) ∈
Oτ ] ≤ exp(−2τ2/(c2n)). The simpler bound in Thm. 19 implies following corollary.
Corollary 21. Let A be an algorithm that outputs a c-sensitive function f : Xn → R. Let S be a
random dataset chosen according to distribution Pn over Xn and let f = A(S). If for β ≥ 0 and τ > 0,
Iβ∞(S;f) ≤ log e · τ2/c2, then P[f(S)− Pn[f ] ≥ τ ] ≤ exp (−τ2/(c2n)) + β. In particular, if A is τ2/(c2n2)-
differentially private then P[f(S)− Pn[f ] ≥ τ ] ≤ exp (−τ2/(c2n)).
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Note that for f(S) = ES [φ], where φ : X → [0, 1] this result requires ε = τ2. The stronger bound allows to
preserve concentration of measure even when ε = τ/(cn) which corresponds to τ = ε when f(S) = ES [φ].
Corollary 22. Let A be an algorithm that outputs a c-sensitive function f : Xn → R. Let S be a random
dataset chosen according to distribution Pn over Xn and let f = A(S). If A is τ/(cn)-differentially private
then P[f(S)− Pn[f ] ≥ τ ] ≤ exp (−3τ2/(4c2n)).
Proof. We apply Theorem 20 with β = 2 exp (−τ2/(c2n)) to obtain that
Iβ∞(S;f) ≤ log e · (ε2n/2 + ε
√
n ln(2/β)/2)) ≤ log e · (τ2/(c2n)/2 + τ2/(c2n)/
√
2).
Applying Thm. 13 to McDiarmid’s inequality we obtain that
P[f(S)− Pn[f ] ≥ τ ] ≤ exp ((1/2 + 1/
√
2)τ2/(c2n)) · exp (−2τ2/(c2n)) + 2 exp (−τ2/(c2n))
≤ exp (−3τ2/(4c2n)),
where the last inequality holds when τ2/(c2n) is larger than a fixed constant.
4 Reusable Holdout
We describe two simple algorithms that enable validation of analyst’s queries in the adaptive setting.
4.1 Thresholdout
Our first algorithm Thresholdout follows the approach in [DFH+14] where differentially private algorithms are
used to answer adaptively chosen statistical queries. This approach can also be applied to any low-sensitivity
functions 2 of the dataset but for simplicity we present the results for statistical queries. Here we address an
easier problem in which the analyst’s queries only need to be answered when they overfit. Also, unlike in
[DFH+14], the analyst has full access to the training set and the holdout algorithm only prevents overfitting
to holdout dataset. As a result, unlike in the general query answering setting, our algorithm can efficiently
validate an exponential in n number of queries as long as a relatively small number of them overfit.
Thresholdout is given access to the training dataset St and holdout dataset Sh and a budget limit B. It
allows any query of the form φ : X → [0, 1] and its goal is to provide an estimate of P[φ]. To achieve this
the algorithm gives an estimate of ESh [φ] in a way that prevents overfitting of functions generated by the
analyst to the holdout set. In other words, responses of Thresholdout are designed to ensure that, with high
probability, ESh [φ] is close to P[φ] and hence an estimate of ESh [φ] gives an estimate of the true expectation
P[φ]. Given a function φ, Thresholdout first checks if the difference between the average value of φ on the
training set St (or ESt [φ]) and the average value of φ on the holdout set Sh (or ESh [φ]) is below a certain
threshold T + η. Here, T is a fixed number such as 0.01 and η is a Laplace noise variable whose standard
deviation needs to be chosen depending on the desired guarantees (The Laplace distribution is a symmetric
exponential distribution.) If the difference is below the threshold, then the algorithm returns ESt [φ]. If the
difference is above the threshold, then the algorithm returns ESh [φ] + ξ for another Laplacian noise variable
ξ. Each time the difference is above threshold the “overfitting” budget B is reduced by one. Once it is
exhausted, Thresholdout stops answering queries. In Fig. 1 we provide the pseudocode of Thresholdout.
We now establish the formal generalization guarantees that Thresholdout enjoys. As the first step we state
what privacy parameters are achieved by Thresholdout.
Lemma 23. Thresholdout satisfies (2B/(σn), 0)-differential privacy. Thresholdout also satisfies (
√
32B ln(2/δ)/(σn), δ)-
differential privacy for any δ > 0.
2Guarantees based on pure differential privacy follow from the same analysis. Proving generalization guarantees for
low-sensitivity queries based on approximate differential privacy requires a modification of Thresholdout using techniques in
[BSSU15].
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Algorithm Thresholdout Input: Training set St, holdout set Sh, threshold T, noise rate σ, budget B
1. sample γ ∼ Lap(2 · σ); Tˆ ← T + γ
2. For each query φ do
(a) if B < 1 output “⊥”
(b) else
i. sample η ∼ Lap(4 · σ)
ii. if |ESh [φ]− ESt [φ]| > Tˆ + η
A. sample ξ ∼ Lap(σ), γ ∼ Lap(2 · σ)
B. B ← B − 1 and Tˆ ← T + γ
C. output ESh [φ] + ξ
iii. else output ESt [φ].
Figure 1: The details of Thresholdout algorithm
Proof. Thresholdout is an instantiation of a basic tool from differential privacy, the “Sparse Vector Algorithm”
([DR14, Algorithm 2]), together with the Laplace mechanism ([DR14, Defn. 3.3]). The sparse vector algorithm
takes as input a sequence of c sensitivity 1/n queries3 (here c = B, the budget), and for each query, attempts
to determine whether the value of the query, evaluated on the private dataset, is above a fixed threshold T or
below it. In our instantiation, the holdout set Sh is the private data set, and each function φ corresponds to
the following query evaluated on Sh: fφ(Sh) := |ESh [φ] − ESt [φ]|. (Note that the training set St is viewed
as part of the definition of the query). Thresholdout then is equivalent to the following procedure: we run
the sparse vector algorithm [DR14, Algorithm 2] with c = B, queries fφ for each function φ, and noise
rate 2σ. Whenever an above-threshold query is reported by the sparse vector algorithm, we release its
value using the Laplace mechanism [DR14, Defn. 3.3] with noise rate σ (this is what occurs every time
Thresholdout answers by outputting ESh [φ] + ξ). By the privacy guarantee of the sparse vector algorithm
([DR14, Thm. 3.25]), the sparse vector portion of Thresholdout satisfies (B/(σn), 0)-differential privacy, and
simultaneously satisfies (
√
8B ln(2/δ)
σn , δ/2)-differential privacy. The Laplace mechanism portion of Thresholdout
satisfies (B/(σn), 0)-differential privacy by [DR14, Thm. 3.6], and simultaneously satisfies (
√
8B ln(2/δ)
σn , δ/2)-
differential privacy by [DR14, Thm. 3.6] and [DR14, Cor. 3.21]. Finally, the composition of two mechanisms,
the first of which is (1, δ1)-differentially private, and the second of which is (2, δ2)-differentially private is
itself (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially private (Thm. 3). Adding the privacy parameters of the Sparse Vector
portion of Thresholdout and the Laplace mechanism portion of Thresholdout yield the parameters of our
theorem.
We note that tighter privacy parameters are possible (e.g. by invoking the parameters and guarantees of
the algorithm “NumericSparse” ([DR14, Algorithm 3]), which already combines the Laplace addition step) –
we chose simpler parameters for clarity.
Note the seeming discrepancy between the guarantee provided by Thresholdout and generalization
guarantees in Theorem 8 and Corollary 7: while Theorem 8 promises generalization bounds for functions that
are generated by a differentially private algorithm, here we allow an arbitrary data analyst to generate query
functions in any way she chooses, with access to the training set and differentially private estimates of the
means of her functions on the holdout set. The connection comes from preservation of differential privacy
guarantee under post-processing (Lem. 5).
We can now quantify the number of samples necessary to achieve generalization error τ with probability
3In fact, the theorems for the Sparse Vector algorithm in Dwork and Roth are stated for sensitivity 1 queries – we use them
for sensitivity 1/n queries of the form ESh [φ], which results in all of the bounds being scaled down by a factor of n.
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at least 1− β.
Lemma 24. Let τ, β, T,B > 0. Let S denote the holdout dataset of size n drawn i.i.d. from a distribution P.
Consider an algorithm that is given access to St and adaptively chooses functions φ1, . . . ,φm : X → [0, 1]
while interacting with Thresholdout which is given datasets S, St and parameters σ,B, T . If
n ≥ n0(B, σ, τ, β) .= max{2B/(στ), ln(6/β)/τ2}
or
n ≥ n1(B, σ, τ, β) .= 80 ·
√
B ln(1/(τβ))
τσ
then for every i ∈ [m], P [|P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β.
Proof. Consider the first guarantee of Lemma 23. In order to achieve generalization error τ via Corollary 7
(i.e. in order to guarantee that for every function φ we have: P [|P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ 6e−τ2n) we need
to have n large enough to achieve (ε, 0)-differential privacy for ε = τ . To achieve this it suffices to have
n ≥ 2B/(στ). By ensuring that n ≥ ln(6/β)/τ2 we also have that 6e−τ2n ≤ β.
We can also make use of the second guarantee in Lemma 23 together with the results of Nissim and
Stemmer [NS15] (Thm. 8). In order to achieve generalization error τ with probability 1− β (i.e. in order
to guarantee for every function φ we have: P [|P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β), we can apply Thm. 8 by setting
 =
√
32B ln(2/δ)/(σn) = τ/13 and δ = βτ26 ln (26/τ) . We can obtain these privacy parameters from Lemma 23
by choosing any n ≥ 80·
√
B ln(1/(τβ))
τσ (for sufficiently small β and τ). We remark that a somewhat worse bound
of n1(B, σ, τ, β) =
√
2048 ln(8/β)
τ3/2σ
follows by setting  = τ/4 and δ = (β/8)4/τ in [DFH+14, Thm. 10].
Both settings lead to small generalization error and so we can pick whichever gives the larger bound.
The first bound has grows linearly with B but is simpler can be easily extended to other distributions over
datasets and to low-sensitivity functions. The second bound has quadratically better dependence on B at
the expense of a slightly worse dependence on τ . We can now apply our main results to get a generalization
bound for the entire execution of Thresholdout.
Theorem 25. Let β, τ > 0 and m ≥ B > 0. We set T = 3τ/4 and σ = τ/(96 ln(4m/β)). Let S denote a
holdout dataset of size n drawn i.i.d. from a distribution P and St be any additional dataset over X . Consider
an algorithm that is given access to St and adaptively chooses functions φ1, . . . ,φm while interacting with
Thresholdout which is given datasets S, St and values σ,B, T . For every i ∈ [m], let ai denote the answer of
Thresholdout on function φi : X → [0, 1]. Further, for every i ∈ [m], we define the counter of overfitting
Zi
.
= |{j ≤ i : |P[φj ]− ESt [φj ]| > τ/2}| .
Then
P [∃i ∈ [m],Zi < B & |ai − P[φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β
whenever n ≥ min{n0(B, σ, τ/8, β/(2m)), n1(B, σ, τ/8, β/(2m))} = O
(
ln(m/β)
τ2
)
·min{B,√B ln(ln(m/β)/τ)}.
Proof. There are two types of error we need to control: the deviation between ai and the average value of
φi on the holdout set ES [φi], and the deviation between the average value of φi on the holdout set and the
expectation of φi on the underlying distribution, P[φi]. Specifically, we decompose the error as
P[ai 6= ⊥ & |ai − P[φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ P [ai 6= ⊥ & |ai − ES [φi]| ≥ 7τ/8] + P [|P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ/8] . (4)
To control the first term we need to bound the values of noise variables used by Thresholdout. For the second
term we will use the generalization properties of Thresholdout given in Lemma 24.
We now deal with the errors introduced by the noise variables. For i ∈ [m], let ηi, ξi and γi denote the
random variables η, ξ and γ, respectively, at step i of the execution of Thresholdout. We first note that each of
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these variables is chosen from Laplace distribution at most m times. By properties of the Laplace distribution
with parameter 4σ, we know that for every t > 0, P[|ηi| ≥ t · 4σ] = e−t/2. Therefore for t = 2 ln(4m/β) we
obtain
P[|ηi| ≥ 2 ln(4m/β) · 4σ] ≤ e−t/2 = β
4m
.
By the definition of σ, 8 ln(4m/β) · σ = τ/12. Applying the union bound we obtain that
P[∃i, |ηi| ≥ τ/12] ≤ β/4,
where by ∃i we refer to ∃i ∈ [m] for brevity. Similarly, ξi and γi are obtained by sampling from the Laplace
distribution and each is re-randomized at most B times. Therefore
P[∃i, |γi| ≥ τ/24] ≤ B · β/4m ≤ β/4
and
P[∃i, |ξi| ≥ τ/48] ≤ B · β/4m ≤ β/4.
For answers that are different from ⊥, we can now bound the first term of Equation (4) by considering two
cases, depending on whether Thresholdout answers query φi by returning ai = ES [φi] + ξi or by returning
ai = ESt [φi]. First, consider queries whose answers are returned using the former condition. Under this
condition, |ai − ES [φi]| = |ξi|. Next, we consider the second case, those queries whose answers are returned
using ESt [φi]. By definition of the algorithm, we have
|ai − ES [φi]| = |ESt [φi]− ES [φi]| ≤ T + γi + ηi ≤ 3τ/4 + |γi|+ |ηi|.
Combining these two cases implies that
P [∃i, ai 6= ⊥ & |ai − ES [φi]| ≥ 7τ/8] ≤ max{P [∃i, |ξi| ≥ 7τ/8] , P [∃i, |γi|+ |ηi| ≥ τ/8]}.
Noting that τ/24 + τ/12 = τ/8 and applying our bound on variables ηi, ξi and γi we get
P [∃i, ai 6= ⊥ & |ai − ES [φi]| ≥ 7τ/8] ≤ β/2. (5)
By Lemma 24, for n ≥ min{n0(B, σ, τ/8, β/2m), n1(B, σ, τ/8, β/2m)},
P [|P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ/8] ≤ β/2m.
Applying the union bound we obtain
P [∃i, |P[φi]− ES [φi]| ≥ τ/8] ≤ β/2.
Combining this with Equation (5) and using in Equation (4) we get that
P[∃i, ai 6= ⊥ & |ai − P[φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β.
To finish the proof we show that under the conditions on the noise variables and generalization error
used above, we have that if Zi < B then ai 6= ⊥. To see this, observe that for every j ≤ i that reduces
Thresholdout’s budget, we have
|P[φj ]− ESt [φj ]| ≥ |ES [φj ]− ESt [φj ]| − |P[φj ]− ES [φj ]|
≥ |T + γj + ηj | − |P[φj ]− ES [φj ]|
≥ T − |γj | − |ηj | − |P[φj ]− ES [φj ]|.
This means that for every j ≤ i that reduces the budget we have |P [φj ]−ESt [φj ]| ≥ 3τ/4−τ/24−τ/12−τ/8 =
τ/2 and hence (when the conditions on the noise variables and generalization error are satisfied) for every i,
if Zi < B then Thresholdout’s budget is not yet exhausted and ai 6= ⊥. We can therefore conclude that
P[∃i,Zi < B & |ai − P[φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β.
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Note that in the final bound on n, the term O
(
ln(m/β)
τ2
)
is equal (up to a constant factor) to the number
of samples that are necessary to answer m non-adaptively chosen queries with tolerance τ and confidence 1−β.
In particular, as in the non-adaptive setting, achievable tolerance τ scales as 1/
√
n (up to the logarithmic
factor). Further, this bound allows m to be exponentially large in n as long as B grows sub-quadratically in
n (that is, B ≤ n2−c for a constant c > 0).
Remark 26. In Thm. 25 Sh is used solely to provide a candidate estimate of the expectation of each query
function. The theorem holds for any other way to provide such estimates. In addition, the one-sided version
of the algorithm can be used when catching only the one-sided error is necessary. For example, in many cases
overfitting is problematic only if the training error estimate is larger than the true error. This is achieved by
using the condition ESh [φ]− ESt [φ] > Tˆ + η to detect overfitting. In this case only one-sided errors will be
caught by Thresholdout and only one-sided overfitting will decrease the budget.
4.2 SparseValidate
We now present a general algorithm for validation on the holdout set that can validate many arbitrary queries
as long as few of them fail the validation. The algorithm which we refer to as SparseValidate only reveals
information about the holdout set when validation fails and therefore we use bounds based on description
length to analyze its generalization guarantees.
More formally, our algorithm allows the analyst to pick any Boolean function of a dataset ψ (or even any
algorithm that outputs a single bit) and provides back the value of ψ on the holdout set ψ(Sh). SparseValidate
has a budget m for the total number of queries that can be asked and budget B for the number of queries
that returned 1. Once either of the budgets is exhausted, no additional answers are given. We now give a
general description of the guarantees of SparseValidate.
Theorem 27. Let S denote a randomly chosen holdout set of size n. Let A be an algorithm that is given
access to SparseValidate(m,B) and outputs queries ψ1, . . . , ψm such that each ψi is in some set Ψi of functions
from Xn to {0, 1}. Assume that for every i ∈ [m] and ψi ∈ Ψi, P[ψi(S) = 1] ≤ βi. Let ψi be the random
variable equal to the i’th query of A on S. Then P[ψi(S) = 1] ≤ `i · βi, where `i =
∑min{i−1,B}
j=0
(
i
j
) ≤ mB.
Proof. Let B denote the algorithm that represents view the interaction of A with SparseValidate(m,B) up
until query i and outputs the all the i− 1 responses of SparseValidate(m,B) in this interaction. If there are B
responses with value 1 in the interaction then all the responses after the last one are meaningless and can be
assumed to be equal to 0. The number of binary strings of length i− 1 that contain at most B ones is exactly
`i =
∑min{i−1,B}
j=0
(
i
j
)
. Therefore we can assume that the output domain of B has size `i and we denote it
by Y. Now, for y ∈ Y let R(y) be the set of datasets S such that ψi(S) = 1, where ψi is the function that
A generates when the responses of SparseValidate(m,B) are y and the input holdout dataset is S (for now
assume that A is deterministic). By the conditions of the theorem we have that for every y, P[S ∈ R(y)] ≤ βi.
Applying Thm. 9 to B, we get that P[S ∈ R(B(S))] ≤ `iβi, which is exactly the claim. We note that to
address the case when A is randomized (including dependent on the random choice of the training set) we
can use the argument above for every fixing of all the random bits of A. From there we obtain that the claim
holds when the probability is taken also over the randomness of A.
We remark that the proof can also be obtained via a more direct application of the union bound over all
strings in Y. But the proof via Thm. 9 demonstrates the conceptual role that short description length plays
in this application.
In this general formulation it is the analyst’s responsibility to use the budgets economically and pick
query functions that do not fail validation often. At the same time, SparseValidate ensures that (for the
appropriate values of the parameters) the analyst can think of the holdout set as a fresh sample for the
purposes of validation. Hence the analyst can pick queries in such a way that failing the validation reliably
indicates overfitting. To relate this algorithm to Thresholdout, consider the validation query function that
is the indicator of the condition |ESh [φ]− ESt [φ]| > Tˆ + η (note that this condition can be evaluated using
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an algorithm with access to Sh). This is precisely the condition that consumes the overfitting budget of
Thresholdout. Now, as in Thresholdout, for every fixed φ, P[|ESh [φ]−P[φ]| ≥ τ ] ≤ 2e−2τ
2n. If B ≤ τ2n/ lnm,
then we obtain that for every query φ generated by the analyst, we still have strong concentration of the mean
on the holdout set around the expectation: P[|ESh [φ]−P [φ]| ≥ τ ] ≤ 2e−τ
2n. This implies that if the condition
|ESh [φ]−ESt [φ]| > Tˆ +η holds, then with high probability also the condition |P [φ]−ESt [φ]| > Tˆ +η− τ holds,
indicating overfitting. One notable distinction of Thresholdout from SparseValidate is that SparseValidate does
not provide corrections in the case of overfitting. One way to remedy that is simply to use a version of
SparseValidate that allows functions with values in {0, 1, . . . , L}. It is easy to see that for such functions
we would obtain the bound of the form `i · Lmin{B,i−1} · βi. To output a value in [0, 1] with precision τ ,
L = b1/τc would suffice. However, in many cases a more economical solution would be to have a separate
dataset which is used just for obtaining the correct estimates.
An example of the application of SparseValidate for answering statistical and low-sensitivity queries that is
based on our analysis can be found in [BSSU15]. The analysis of generalization on the holdout set in [BH15]
and the analysis of the Median Mechanism we give in Section B also rely on this sparsity-based technique.
An alternative view of this algorithm is as a general template for designing algorithms for answering some
specific type of adaptively chosen queries. Generalization guarantees specific to the type of query can then be
obtained from our general analysis. For example, an algorithm that fits a mixture of Gaussians model to the
data could define the validation query to be an algorithm that fits the mixture model to the holdout and
obtains a vector of parameters Θh. The validation query then compares it with the vector of parameters Θt
obtained on the training set and outputs 1 if the parameter vectors are “not close” (indicating overfitting).
Given guarantees of statistical validity of the parameter estimation method in the static setting one could
then derive guarantees for adaptive validation via Thm. 27.
5 Experiments
We describe a simple experiment on synthetic data that illustrates the danger of reusing a standard holdout
set and how this issue can be resolved by our reusable holdout. In our experiment the analyst wants to
build a classifier via the following common strategy. First the analyst finds a set of single attributes that
are correlated with the class label. Then the analyst aggregates the correlated variables into a single model
of higher accuracy (for example using boosting or bagging methods). More formally, the analyst is given
a d-dimensional labeled data set S of size 2n and splits it randomly into a training set St and a holdout
set Sh of equal size. We denote an element of S by a tuple (x, y) where x is a d-dimensional vector and
y ∈ {−1, 1} is the corresponding class label. The analyst wishes to select variables to be included in her
classifier. For various values of the number of variables to select k, she picks k variables with the largest
absolute correlations with the label. However, she verifies the correlations (with the label) on the holdout set
and uses only those variables whose correlation agrees in sign with the correlation on the training set and
both correlations are larger than some threshold in absolute value. She then creates a simple linear threshold
classifier on the selected variables using only the signs of the correlations of the selected variables. A final
test evaluates the classification accuracy of the classifier on both the training set and the holdout set.
Formally, the algorithm is used to build a linear threshold classifier:
1. For each attribute i ∈ [d] compute the correlation with the label on the training and holdout sets:
wti =
∑
(x,y)∈St xiy and w
h
i =
∑
(x,y)∈Sh xiy. Let
W =
{
i | wti · whi > 0; |wti | ≥ 1/
√
n; |whi | ≥ 1/
√
n|}
that is the set of variables for which wti and w
h
i have the same sign and both are at least 1/
√
n in
absolute value (this is the standard deviation of the correlation in our setting). Let Vk be the subset of
variables in W with k largest values of |wti |.
2. Construct the classifier f(x) = sgn
(∑
i∈Vk sgn(w
t
i) · xi
)
.
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In the experiments we used an implementation of Thresholdout that differs somewhat from the algorithm
we analyzed theoretically (given in Figure 1). Specifically, we set the parameters to be T = 0.04 and τ = 0.01.
This is lower than the values necessary for the proof (and which are not intended for direct application)
but suffices to prevent overfitting in our experiment. Second, we use Gaussian noise instead of Laplacian
noise as it has stronger concentration properties (in many differential privacy applications similar theoretical
guarantees hold mechanisms based on Gaussian noise).
No correlation between labels and data: In our first experiment, each attribute is drawn independently
from the normal distribution N(0, 1) and we choose the class label y ∈ {−1, 1} uniformly at random so that
there is no correlation between the data point and its label. We chose n = 10, 000, d = 10, 000 and varied
the number of selected variables k. In this scenario no classifier can achieve true accuracy better than 50%.
Nevertheless, reusing a standard holdout results in reported accuracy of over 63% for k = 500 on both the
training set and the holdout set (the standard deviation of the error is less than 0.5%). The average and
standard deviation of results obtained from 100 independent executions of the experiment are plotted in
Figure 2 which also includes the accuracy of the classifier on another fresh data set of size n drawn from
the same distribution. We then executed the same algorithm with our reusable holdout. The algorithm
Thresholdout was invoked with T = 0.04 and τ = 0.01 explaining why the accuracy of the classifier reported
by Thresholdout is off by up to 0.04 whenever the accuracy on the holdout set is within 0.04 of the accuracy
on the training set. Thresholdout prevents the algorithm from overfitting to the holdout set and gives a valid
estimate of classifier accuracy.
0 100 200 300 400 500
number of variables
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
a
cc
u
ra
cy
Standard holdout
training
holdout
fresh
0 100 200 300 400 500
number of variables
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
a
cc
u
ra
cy
Thresholdout
training
holdout
fresh
Figure 2: No correlation between class labels and data points. The plot shows the classification accuracy of the
classifier on training, holdout and fresh sets. Margins indicate the standard deviation.
High correlation between labels and some of the variables: In our second experiment, the class
labels are correlated with some of the variables. As before the label is randomly chosen from {−1, 1} and
each of the attributes is drawn from N(0, 1) aside from 20 attributes which are drawn from N(y · 0.06, 1)
where y is the class label. We execute the same algorithm on this data with both the standard holdout and
Thresholdout and plot the results in Figure 3. Our experiment shows that when using the reusable holdout,
the algorithm still finds a good classifier while preventing overfitting. This illustrates that the reusable
holdout simultaneously prevents overfitting and allows for the discovery of true statistical patterns.
In Figures 2 and 3, simulations that used Thresholdout for selecting the variables also show the accuracy
on the holdout set as reported by Thresholdout. For comparison purposes, in Figure 4 we plot the actual
accuracy of the generated classifier on the holdout set (the parameters of the simulation are identical to those
used in Figures 2 and 3). It demonstrates that there is essentially no overfitting to the holdout set. Note
that the advantage of the accuracy reported by Thresholdout is that it can be used to make further data
dependent decisions while mitigating the risk of overfitting.
Discussion of the results: Overfitting to the standard holdout set arises in our experiment because the
analyst reuses the holdout after using it to measure the correlation of single attributes. We first note that
neither cross-validation nor bootstrap resolve this issue. If we used either of these methods to validate the
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Figure 3: Some variables are correlated with the label.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of the classifier produced with Thresholdout on the holdout set.
correlations, overfitting would still arise due to using the same data for training and validation (of the final
classifier). It is tempting to recommend other solutions to the specific problem we used in our experiment.
Indeed, a significant number of methods in the statistics and machine learning literature deal with inference
for fixed two-step procedures where the first step is variable selection (see [HTF09] for examples). Our
experiment demonstrates that even in such simple and standard settings our method avoids overfitting
without the need to use a specialized procedure – and, of course, extends more broadly. More importantly,
the reusable holdout gives the analyst a general and principled method to perform multiple validation steps
where previously the only known safe approach was to collect a fresh holdout set each time a function depends
on the outcomes of previous validations.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we give a unifying view of two techniques (differential privacy and description length bounds)
which preserve the generalization guarantees of subsequent algorithms in adaptively chosen sequences of data
analyses. Although these two techniques both imply low max-information – and hence can be composed
together while preserving their guarantees – the kinds of guarantees that can be achieved by either alone are
incomparable. This suggests that the problem of generalization guarantees under adaptivity is ripe for future
study on two fronts. First, the existing theory is likely already strong enough to develop practical algorithms
with rigorous generalization guarantees, of which Thresholdout is an example. However additional empirical
work is needed to better understand when and how the theory should be applied in specific application
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scenarios. At the same time, new theory is also needed. As an example of a basic question we still do
not know the answer to: even in the simple setting of adaptively reusing a holdout set for computing the
expectations of boolean-valued predicates, is it possible to obtain stronger generalization guarantees (via any
means) than those that are known to be achievable via differential privacy?
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A From Max-information to Randomized Description Length
In this section we demonstrate additional connections between max-information, differential privacy and
description length. These connections are based on a generalization of description length to randomized
algorithms that we refer to as randomized description length.
Definition 28. For a universe Y let A be a randomized algorithm with input in X and output in Y. We say
that the output of A has randomized description length k if for every fixed setting of random coin flips of A
the set of possible outputs of A has size at most 2k.
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We first note that just as the (deterministic) description length, randomized description length implies
generalization and gives a bound on max-information.
Theorem 29. Let A : Xn → Y be an algorithm with randomized description length k and let S be a
random dataset over Xn. Assume that R : Y → 2Xn is such that for every y ∈ Y, P[S ∈ R(y)] ≤ β. Then
P[S ∈ R(A(S))] ≤ 2k · β.
Theorem 30. Let A be an algorithm with randomized description length k taking as an input an n-element
dataset and outputting a value in Y. Then for every β > 0, Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ log(|Y|/β).
Proof. Let S be any random variable over n-element input datasets and let Y be the corresponding output
distribution Y = A(S). It suffices to prove that for every β > 0, Iβ∞(S;Y ) ≤ k + log(1/β).
Let R be the set of all possible values of the random bits of A and let R denote the uniform distribution
over a choice of r ∈ R. For r ∈ R, let Ar denote A with the random bits set to r and let Yr = Ar(S). Observe
that by the definition of randomized description length, the range of Ar has size at most 2k. Therefore, by
Theorem 17, we obtain that Iβ∞(S;Yr) ≤ log(2k/β).
For any event O ⊆ Xn × Y we have that
P[(S,Y ) ∈ O] = E
r∼R
[P[(S,Yr) ∈ O]]
≤ E
r∼R
[
2k
β
· P[S × Yr ∈ O] + β
]
=
2k
β
· E
r∼R
[P[S × Yr ∈ O]] + β
=
2k
β
· P[S × Y ∈ O] + β.
By the definition of β-approximate max-information, we obtain that Iβ∞(S;Y ) ≤ log(2k/β).
We next show that if the output of an algorithm A has low approximate max-information about its input
then there exists a (different) algorithm whose output is statistically close to that of A while having short
randomized description. We remark that this reduction requires the knowledge of the marginal distribution
A(S).
Lemma 31. Let A be a randomized algorithm taking as an input a dataset of n points from X and outputting
a value in Y. Let Z be a random variable over Y. For k > 0 and a dataset S let βS = min{β | Dβ∞(A(S)‖Z) ≤
k}. There exists an algorithm A′ that given S ∈ Xn, β, k and any β′ > 0,
1. the output of A′ has randomized description length k + log ln(1/β′).
2. for every S, ∆(A′(S),A(S)) ≤ βS + β′.
Proof. Let S denote the input dataset. By definition of βS , D
βS∞ (A(S)‖Z) ≤ k. By the properties of
approximate divergence (e.g.[DR14]), DβS∞ (A(S)‖Z) ≤ k implies that there exists a random variable Y such
that ∆(A(S),Y ) ≤ βS and D∞(Y ‖Z) ≤ k.
For t = 2k ln(1/β′) the algorithm A′ randomly and independently chooses t samples from Z. Denote
them by y1, y2, . . . , yt. For i = 1, 2, . . . , t, A′ outputs yi with probability pi = P[Y =yi]2k·P[Z=yi] and goes to the next
sample otherwise. Note that pi ∈ [0, 1] and therefore this is a legal choice of probability. When all samples
are exhausted the algorithm outputs y1.
We first note that by the definition of this algorithm its output has randomized description length
log t = k + log ln(1/β′). Let T denote the event that at least one of the samples was accepted. Conditioned
on this event the output of A′(S) is distributed according to Y . For each i,
E
yi∼p(Z)
[pi] = E
yi∼p(Z)
[
P[Y = yi]
2k · P[Z = yi]
]
=
∑
yi∈Y
P[Y = yi]
2k
=
1
2k
.
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This means that the probability that none of t samples will be accepted is (1− 2−k)t ≤ et/2k ≤ β′. Therefore
∆(A′(S),Y ) ≤ β′ and, consequently, ∆(A′(S),A(S)) ≤ βS + β′.
We can now use Lemma 31 to show that if for a certain random choice of a dataset S, the output of A has
low approximate max-information then there exists an algorithm A′ whose output on S has low randomized
description length and is statistically close to the output distribution of A.
Theorem 32. Let S be a random dataset in Xn and A be an algorithm taking as an input a dataset in
Xn and having a range Y. Assume that for some β ≥ 0, Iβ∞(S;A(S)) = k. For any β′ > 0, there exists an
algorithm A′ taking as an input a dataset in Xn such that
1. the output of A′ has randomized description length k + log ln(1/β′);
2. ∆((S,A′(S)), (S,A(S)) ≤ β + β′.
Proof. For a dataset S let βS = min{β | Dβ∞(A(S)‖A(S)) ≤ k}. To prove this result it suffices to observe
that E[βS ] ≤ β and then apply Lemma 31 with Z = A(S) To show that E[βS ] ≤ β let OS ⊆ Y denote an
event such that P[A(S) ∈ OS ] = 2k · P[A(S) ∈ OS ] + βS . Let O =
⋃
S∈Xn{(S,OS)}. Then,
P[(S,A(S) ∈ O] = E
S∼p(S)
[P[(S,A(S) ∈ OS ]]
= E
S∼p(S)
[
2k · P[A(S) ∈ OS ] + βS
]
= 2k · P[S ×A(S) ∈ O] + E[βS ].
If E[βS ] > β then it would hold for some k′ > k that P[(S,A(S) ∈ O] = 2k′ · P[S × A(S) ∈ O] + β
contradicting the assumption Iβ∞(S;A(S)) = k. We remark that, it is also easy to see that E[βS ] = β.
It is important to note that Theorem 32 is not the converse of Theorem 30 and does not imply equivalence
between max-information and randomized description length. The primary difference is that Theorem 32
defines a new algorithm rather than arguing about the original algorithm. In addition, the new algorithm
requires samples of A(S), that is, it needs to know the marginal distribution on Y. As a more concrete
example, Theorem 32 does not allow us to obtain a description-length-based equivalent of Theorem 20 for all
i.i.d. datasets. On the other hand, any algorithm that has bounded max-information for all distributions over
datasets can be converted to an algorithm with low randomized description length.
Theorem 33. Let A be an algorithm over Xn with range Y and let k = I∞(A, n). For any β > 0, there
exists an algorithm A′ taking as an input a dataset in Xn such that
1. the output of A′ has randomized description length k + log ln(1/β);
2. for every dataset S ∈ Xn, ∆(A′(S),A(S)) ≤ β.
Proof. Let S0 = (x, x, . . . , x) be an n-element dataset for an arbitrary x ∈ X . By Lemma 3 we know that for
every S ∈ Xn, D∞(A(S)‖A(S0)) ≤ k. We can now apply Lemma 31 with Z = A(S0), and β′ = β to obtain
the result.
The conditions of Theorem 33 are satisfied by any ε-differentially private algorithm with k = log e · εn.
This immediately implies that the output of any ε-differentially private algorithm is β-statistically close to
the output of an algorithm with randomized description length of log e · εn+ log ln(1/β). Special cases of
this property have been derived (using a technique similar to Lemma 31) in the context of proving lower
bounds for learning algorithms [BNS13] and communication complexity of differentially private protocols
[MMP+10].
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B Answering Queries via Description Length Bounds
In this section, we show a simple method for answering any adaptively chosen sequence of m statistical queries,
using a number of samples that scales only polylogarithmically in m. This is an exponential improvement
over what would be possible by naively evaluating the queries exactly on the given samples. Algorithms that
achieve such dependence were given in [DFH+14] and [BSSU15] using differentially private algorithms for
answering queries and the connection between generalization and differential privacy (in the same way as
we do in Section 4.1). Here we give a simpler algorithm which we analyze using description length bounds.
The resulting bounds are comparable to those achieved in [DFH+14] using pure differential privacy but are
somewhat weaker than those achieved using approximate differential privacy [DFH+14, BSSU15, NS15].
The mechanism we give here is based on the Median Mechanism of Roth and Roughgarden [RR10]. A
differentially private variant of this mechanism was introduced in [RR10] to show that it was possible to
answer exponentially many adaptively chosen counting queries (these are queries for an estimate of the
empirical mean of a function φ : X → [0, 1] on the dataset). Here we analyze a noise-free version and establish
its properties via a simple description length-based argument. We remark that it is possible to analogously
define and analyze the noise-free version of the Private Multiplicative Weights Mechanism of Hardt and
Rothblum [?]. This somewhat more involved approach would lead to better (but qualitatively similar) bounds.
Recall that statistical queries are defined by functions φ : X → [0, 1], and our goal is to correctly estimate
their expectation P [φ]. The Median Mechanism takes as input a dataset S and an adaptively chosen sequence
of such functions φ1, . . . , φm, and outputs a sequence of answers a1, . . . , am.
Algorithm Median Mechanism
Input: An upper bound m on the total number of queries, a dataset S and an accuracy parameter τ
1. Let α = τ3 .
2. Let Consistent0 = X
logm
α2
3. For a query φi do
(a) Compute apubi = median({ES′ [φi] : S′ ∈ Consistenti−1}).
(b) Compute aprivi = ES [φi].
(c) If
∣∣∣apubi − aprivi ∣∣∣ ≤ 2α Then:
i. Output ai = a
pub
i .
ii. Let Consistenti = Consistenti−1.
(d) Else:
i. Output ai = baprivi cα.
ii. Let Consistenti = {S′ ∈ Consistenti−1 : |ai − ES′ [φi]| ≤ 2α}.
Figure 5: Noise-free version of the Median Mechanism from [RR10]
The guarantee we get for the Median Mechanism is as follows:
Theorem 34. Let β, τ > 0 and m ≥ B > 0. Let S denote a dataset of size n drawn i.i.d. from a distribution P
over X . Consider any algorithm that adaptively chooses functions φ1, . . . ,φm while interacting with the
Median Mechanism which is given S and values τ , β. For every i ∈ [m], let ai denote the answer of the
Median Mechanism on function φi : X → [0, 1]. Then
P [∃i ∈ [m], |ai − P[φi]| ≥ τ ] ≤ β
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whenever
n ≥ n0 = 81 · log |X | · logm · ln(3m/τ)
2τ4
+
9 ln(2m/β)
2τ2
.
Proof. We begin with a simple lemma which informally states that for every distribution P , and for every set
of m functions φ1, . . . , φm, there exists a small dataset that approximately encodes the answers to each of
the corresponding statistical queries.
Lemma 35 ([DR14] Theorem 4.2). For every dataset S over X , any set C = {φ1, . . . , φm} of m functions
φi : X → [0, 1], and any α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a data set S′ ∈ X t of size t = logmα2 such that:
max
φi∈C
|ES [φi]− ES′ [φi]| ≤ α.
Next, we observe that by construction, the Median Mechanism (as presented in Figure 5) always returns
answers that are close to the empirical means of respective query functions.
Lemma 36. For every sequence of queries φ1, . . . , φm and dataset S given to the Median Mechanism, we
have that for every i:
|ai − ES [φi]| ≤ 2α.
Finally, we give a simple lemma from [RR10] that shows that the Median Mechanism only returns answers
computed using the dataset S in a small number of rounds – for any other round i, the answer returned is
computed from the set Consistenti−1.
Lemma 37 ([RR10], see also Chapter 5.2.1 of [DR14]). For every sequence of queries φ1, . . . , φm and a
dataset S given to the Median Mechanism:∣∣∣{i : ai 6= apubi }∣∣∣ ≤ log |X | logmα2 .
Proof. We simply note several facts. First, by construction, |Consistent0| = |X |logm/α
2
. Second, by Lemma
35, for every i, |Consistenti| ≥ 1 (because for every set of m queries, there is at least one dataset S′ of
size logm/α2 that is consistent up to error α with S on every query asked, and hence is never removed
from Consistenti on any round). Finally, by construction, on any round i such that ai 6= apubi , we have
|Consistenti| ≤ 12 · |Consistenti−1| (because on any such round, the median dataset S′ – and hence at least
half of the datasets in Consistenti−1 were inconsistent with the answer given, and hence removed.) The
lemma follows from the fact that there can therefore be at most log
(
|X |logm/α2
)
many such rounds.
Our analysis proceeds by viewing the interaction between the data analyst and the Median Mechanism
(Fig. 5) as a single algorithm A. A takes as input a dataset S and outputs a set of queries and answers
A(S) = {φi, ai}mi=1. We will show that A’s output has short randomized description length (the data analyst
is a possibly randomized algorithm and hence A might be randomized).
Lemma 38. Algorithm A has randomized description length of at most
b ≤ log |X | · logm
α2
·
(
logm+ log
1
α
)
bits.
Proof. We observe that for every fixing of the random bits of the data analyst the entire sequence of queries
asked by the analyst, together with the answers he receives, can be reconstructed from a record of the
indices i of the queries φi such that ai 6= apubi , together with their answers ai (i.e. it is sufficient to encode
M := {(i, ai) | ai 6= apubi }. Once this is established, the lemma follows because by Lemma 37, there are at
most
(
log |X | logm
α2
)
such queries, and for each one, its index can be encoded with logm bits, and its answer
with log 1α bits.
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To see why this is so, consider the following procedure for reconstructing the sequence (φ1, a1, . . . , φm, am)
of queries asked and answers received. For every fixing of the random bits of the data analyst, her queries
can be expressed as a sequence of functions (f1, . . . , fm) that take as input the queries previously asked to
the Median Mechanism, and the answers previously received, and output the next query to be asked. That is,
we have:
f1() := φ1, f2(φ1, a1) := φ2, f3(φ1, a1, φ2, a2) := φ3, . . . , fm(φ1, a1, . . . , φm−1, am−1) := φm.
Assume inductively that at stage i, the procedure has successfully reconstructed (φ1, a1, . . . , φi−1, ai−1, φi),
and the set Consistenti−1 (This is trivially satisfied at stage i = 1). For the inductive case, we need to recover
ai, φi+1, and Consistenti. There are two cases we must consider at stage i. In the first case, i is such that
ai 6= apubi . But in this case, (i, ai) ∈ M by definition, and so we have recovered ai, and we can compute
φi+1 = fi+1(φ1, a1, . . . , φ1, ai), and can compute Consistenti = {S′ ∈ Consistenti−1 : |ai − ES′ [φi]| ≤ 2α}. In
the other case, ai = a
pub
i . But in this case, by definition of a
pub
i , we can compute ai = median({ES′ [φi] :
S′ ∈ Consistenti−1}), φi+1 = fi+1(φ1, a1, . . . , φi, ai), and Conisistenti = Consistenti−1. This completes the
argument – by induction, M is enough to reconstruct the entire query/answer sequence.
Finally, we can complete the proof. By Hoeffding’s concentration inequality and the union bound we know
that for any every sequence of queries φ1, . . . , φm and a dataset S of size n drawn from the distribution Pn:
P [∃i, |ES [φi]− P[φi]| ≥ α] ≤ 2m · exp
(−2nα2) .
Applying Theorem 29 to the set R(φ1, a1, . . . , φm, am) = {S | ∃i, |ES [φi]− P[φi]| ≥ α} we obtain that for
the queries φ1, . . . ,φm generated on the dataset S and corresponding answers of the Median Mechanism
a1, . . . ,am we have
P [∃i, |ES [φi]− P[φi]| ≥ α] ≤ 2b · 2m · exp
(−2nα2) .
≤ 2 log |X| logmα2 ·log(m/α) · 2m · exp (−2nα2) .
Solving, we have that whenever:
n ≥ log |X | · logm
2α4
· ln(m/α) + ln(2m/β)
2α2
,
we have: P [∃i, |ES [φi]− P[φi]| ≥ α] ≤ β. Combining this with Lemma 36 we have:
P [∃i ∈ [m], |ai − P[φi]| ≥ 3α] ≤ β.
Plugging in τ = 3α gives the theorem.
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